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In this research we'll be revisiting the USB port – this time in attempts to intercept user authentication data on the system that a microcomputer is connected to.

As we discovered, this type of attack successfully allows an intruder to retrieve user authentication data – even when the targeted system is locked.
There've been citizen developers as long as there've been computers.

Back at the start of my career, I wrote a filter modelling tool in QuickBasic after filing up sheets of paper with the math I needed for only one project.
If I'd been doing that a ...
Security Update for Adobe Flash Player (3214628)Published: January 10, 2017Version: 1.0This security update resolves vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player when installed on all supported editions of Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016.This security update is rated Critical.

The update addresses the vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player by updating the affected Adobe Flash libraries contained within Internet Explorer 10, Internet Explorer 11, and Microsoft Edge.

For more information, see the Affected Software section.For more information about this update, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 3214628.This security update addresses the following vulnerabilities, which are described in Adobe Security Bulletin APSB17-02:CVE-2017-2925, CVE-2017-2926, CVE-2017-2927, CVE-2017-2928, CVE-2017-2930, CVE-2017-2931, CVE-2017-2932, CVE-2017-2933, CVE-2017-2934, CVE-2017-2935, CVE-2017-2936, CVE-2017-2937The following software versions or editions are affected.
Versions or editions that are not listed are either past their support life cycle or are not affected.

To determine the support life cycle for your software version or edition, see Microsoft Support Lifecycle. Operating System Component Aggregate Severity and Impact Updates Replaced*            Windows 8.1 Windows 8.1 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3214628) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3209498 in MS16-154 Windows 8.1 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3214628) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3209498 in MS16-154 Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2 Windows Server 2012 Adobe Flash Player(3214628) ModerateRemote Code Execution 3209498 in MS16-154 Windows Server 2012 R2 Adobe Flash Player(3214628) ModerateRemote Code Execution 3209498 in MS16-154 Windows RT 8.1 Windows RT 8.1 Adobe Flash Player(3214628)[1] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3209498 in MS16-154 Windows 10 Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3214628)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3209498 in MS16-154 Windows 10 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3214628)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3209498 in MS16-154 Windows 10 Version 1511 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3214628)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3209498 in MS16-154 Windows 10 Version 1511 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3214628)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3209498 in MS16-154 Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3214628)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3209498 in MS16-154 Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3214628)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3209498 in MS16-154 Windows Server 2016 Windows Server 2016 for 64-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3214628)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3209498 in MS16-154 [1]This update is available via Windows Update.[2]The Adobe Flash Player updates for Windows 10 updates are available via Windows Update or via the Microsoft Update Catalog.*The Updates Replaced column shows only the latest update in any chain of superseded updates.

For a comprehensive list of updates replaced, go to the Microsoft Update Catalog, search for the update KB number, and then view update details (updates replaced information is provided on the Package Details tab).How could an attacker exploit these vulnerabilities? In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer for the desktop, an attacker could host a specially crafted website that is designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker could also embed an ActiveX control marked "safe for initialization" in an application or Microsoft Office document that hosts the IE rendering engine.

The attacker could also take advantage of compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements.

These websites could contain specially crafted content that could exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email.In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer in the Windows 8-style UI, an attacker would first need to compromise a website already listed in the Compatibility View (CV) list.

An attacker could then host a website that contains specially crafted Flash content designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email.

For more information about Internet Explorer and the CV List, please see the MSDN Article, Developer Guidance for websites with content for Adobe Flash Player in Windows 8.Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability.

The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer for the desktop, an attacker could host a website that contains a webpage that is used to exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In addition, compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these websites.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the website, typically by getting them to click a link in an email message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website. Internet Explorer in the Windows 8-style UI will only play Flash content from sites listed on the Compatibility View (CV) list.

This restriction requires an attacker to first compromise a website already listed on the CV list.

An attacker could then host specially crafted Flash content designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email. By default, all supported versions of Microsoft Outlook and Windows Live Mail open HTML email messages in the Restricted sites zone.

The Restricted sites zone, which disables scripts and ActiveX controls, helps reduce the risk of an attacker being able to use any of these vulnerabilities to execute malicious code.
If a user clicks a link in an email message, the user could still be vulnerable to exploitation of any of these vulnerabilities through the web-based attack scenario. By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration.

This mode can help reduce the likelihood of the exploitation of these Adobe Flash Player vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer. Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update.Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running You can disable attempts to instantiate Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer and other applications that honor the kill bit feature, such as Office 2007 and Office 2010, by setting the kill bit for the control in the registry. Warning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk. To set the kill bit for the control in the registry, perform the following steps: Paste the following into a text file and save it with the .reg file extension. Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 Double-click the .reg file to apply it to an individual system.You can also apply this workaround across domains by using Group Policy.

For more information about Group Policy, see the TechNet article, Group Policy collection. Note You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect. Impact of workaround.

There is no impact as long as the object is not intended to be used in Internet Explorer. How to undo the workaround. Delete the registry keys that were added in implementing this workaround.  Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Internet Explorer through Group Policy Note The Group Policy MMC snap-in can be used to set policy for a machine, for an organizational unit, or for an entire domain.

For more information about Group Policy, visit the following Microsoft Web sites: Group Policy Overview What is Group Policy Object Editor? Core Group Policy tools and settings To disable Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer through Group Policy, perform the following steps: Note This workaround does not prevent Flash from being invoked from other applications, such as Microsoft Office 2007 or Microsoft Office 2010. Open the Group Policy Management Console and configure the console to work with the appropriate Group Policy object, such as local machine, OU, or domain GPO. Navigate to the following node:Administrative Templates -> Windows Components -> Internet Explorer -> Security Features -> Add-on Management Double-click Turn off Adobe Flash in Internet Explorer and prevent applications from using Internet Explorer technology to instantiate Flash objects. Change the setting to Enabled. Click Apply and then click OK to return to the Group Policy Management Console. Refresh Group Policy on all systems or wait for the next scheduled Group Policy refresh interval for the settings to take effect.  Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Office 2010 on affected systems Note This workaround does not prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Internet Explorer. Warning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk. For detailed steps that you can use to prevent a control from running in Internet Explorer, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 240797.

Follow the steps in the article to create a Compatibility Flags value in the registry to prevent a COM object from being instantiated in Internet Explorer. To disable Adobe Flash Player in Office 2010 only, set the kill bit for the ActiveX control for Adobe Flash Player in the registry using the following steps: Create a text file named Disable_Flash.reg with the following contents: Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\Common\COM\Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 Double-click the .reg file to apply it to an individual system. Note You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect. You can also apply this workaround across domains by using Group Policy.

For more information about Group Policy, see the TechNet article, Group Policy collection. Prevent ActiveX controls from running in Office 2007 and Office 2010 To disable all ActiveX controls in Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010, including Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer, perform the following steps: Click File, click Options, click Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings. Click ActiveX Settings in the left-hand pane, and then select Disable all controls without notifications. Click OK to save your settings. Impact of workaround. Office documents that use embedded ActiveX controls may not display as intended. How to undo the workaround. To re-enable ActiveX controls in Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010, perform the following steps: Click File, click Options, click Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings. Click ActiveX Settings in the left-hand pane, and then deselect Disable all controls without notifications. Click OK to save your settings. Set Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones You can help protect against exploitation of these vulnerabilities by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High. To raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, perform the following steps: On the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options. In the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click Internet. Under Security level for this zone, move the slider to High.

This sets the security level for all websites you visit to High. Click Local intranet. Under Security level for this zone, move the slider to High.

This sets the security level for all websites you visit to High. Click OK to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer. Note If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High. Note Setting the level to High may cause some websites to work incorrectly.
If you have difficulty using a website after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites.

This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High. Impact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many websites on the Internet or an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality.

For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements.

Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites.
If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".   Configure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone You can help protect against exploitation of these vulnerabilities by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone.

To do this, perform the following steps: In Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu. Click the Security tab. Click Internet, and then click Custom Level. Under Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK. Click Local intranet, and then click Custom Level. Under Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK. Click OK to return to Internet Explorer, and then click OK again. Note Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some websites to work incorrectly.
If you have difficulty using a website after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites.

This will allow the site to work correctly. Impact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many websites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality.

For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround.

For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting.
If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".   Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone After you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone.

This will allow you to continue to use trusted websites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone. To do this, perform the following steps: In Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab. In the Select a web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites. If you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box. In the Add this website to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add. Repeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone. Click OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer. Note Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system.

Two sites in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com.

These are the sites that will host the update, and they require an ActiveX control to install the update. For Security Update Deployment information, see the Microsoft Knowledge Base article referenced here in the Executive Summary.Microsoft recognizes the efforts of those in the security community who help us protect customers through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.
See Acknowledgments for more information.The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.V1.0 (January, 10 2017): Bulletin published. Page generated 2017-01-03 9:18Z-08:00.
Security Update for Adobe Flash Player (3209498)Published: December 13, 2016Version: 1.0This security update resolves vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player when installed on all supported editions of Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016.This security update is rated Critical.

The update addresses the vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player by updating the affected Adobe Flash libraries contained within Internet Explorer 10, Internet Explorer 11, and Microsoft Edge.

For more information, see the Affected Software section.For more information about this update, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 3209498.This security update addresses the following vulnerabilities, which are described in Adobe Security Bulletin APSB16-39:CVE-2016-7867, CVE-2016-7868, CVE-2016-7869, CVE-2016-7870, CVE-2016-7871, CVE-2016-7872, CVE-2016-7873, CVE-2016-7874, CVE-2016-7875, CVE-2016-7876, CVE-2016-7877, CVE-2016-7878, CVE-2016-7879, CVE-2016-7880, CVE-2016-7881, CVE-2016-7890, CVE-2016-7892The following software versions or editions are affected.
Versions or editions that are not listed are either past their support life cycle or are not affected.

To determine the support life cycle for your software version or edition, see Microsoft Support Lifecycle. Operating System Component Aggregate Severity and Impact Updates Replaced*            Windows 8.1 Windows 8.1 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3209498) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3202790 in MS16-141 Windows 8.1 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3209498) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3202790 in MS16-141 Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2 Windows Server 2012 Adobe Flash Player(3209498) ModerateRemote Code Execution 3202790 in MS16-141 Windows Server 2012 R2 Adobe Flash Player(3209498) ModerateRemote Code Execution 3202790 in MS16-141 Windows RT 8.1 Windows RT 8.1 Adobe Flash Player(3209498)[1] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3202790 in MS16-141 Windows 10 Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3209498)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3202790 in MS16-141 Windows 10 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3209498)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3202790 in MS16-141 Windows 10 Version 1511 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3209498)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3202790 in MS16-141 Windows 10 Version 1511 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3209498)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3202790 in MS16-141 Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3209498)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3202790 in MS16-141 Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3209498)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3202790 in MS16-141 Windows Server 2016 Windows Server 2016 for 64-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3209498)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3202790 in MS16-141 [1]This update is available via Windows Update.[2]The Adobe Flash Player updates for Windows 10 updates are available via Windows Update or via the Microsoft Update Catalog.Note The vulnerabilities discussed in this bulletin affect Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview 5.

To be protected from the vulnerabilities, Microsoft recommends that customers running this operating system apply the current update, which is available exclusively from Windows Update.*The Updates Replaced column shows only the latest update in any chain of superseded updates.

For a comprehensive list of updates replaced, go to the Microsoft Update Catalog, search for the update KB number, and then view update details (updates replaced information is provided on the Package Details tab).How could an attacker exploit these vulnerabilities? In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer for the desktop, an attacker could host a specially crafted website that is designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker could also embed an ActiveX control marked "safe for initialization" in an application or Microsoft Office document that hosts the IE rendering engine.

The attacker could also take advantage of compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements.

These websites could contain specially crafted content that could exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email.In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer in the Windows 8-style UI, an attacker would first need to compromise a website already listed in the Compatibility View (CV) list.

An attacker could then host a website that contains specially crafted Flash content designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email.

For more information about Internet Explorer and the CV List, please see the MSDN Article, Developer Guidance for websites with content for Adobe Flash Player in Windows 8.Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability.

The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer for the desktop, an attacker could host a website that contains a webpage that is used to exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In addition, compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these websites.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the website, typically by getting them to click a link in an email message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website. Internet Explorer in the Windows 8-style UI will only play Flash content from sites listed on the Compatibility View (CV) list.

This restriction requires an attacker to first compromise a website already listed on the CV list.

An attacker could then host specially crafted Flash content designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email. By default, all supported versions of Microsoft Outlook and Windows Live Mail open HTML email messages in the Restricted sites zone.

The Restricted sites zone, which disables scripts and ActiveX controls, helps reduce the risk of an attacker being able to use any of these vulnerabilities to execute malicious code.
If a user clicks a link in an email message, the user could still be vulnerable to exploitation of any of these vulnerabilities through the web-based attack scenario. By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration.

This mode can help reduce the likelihood of the exploitation of these Adobe Flash Player vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer. Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update.Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running You can disable attempts to instantiate Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer and other applications that honor the kill bit feature, such as Office 2007 and Office 2010, by setting the kill bit for the control in the registry. Warning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk. To set the kill bit for the control in the registry, perform the following steps: Paste the following into a text file and save it with the .reg file extension. Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 Double-click the .reg file to apply it to an individual system.You can also apply this workaround across domains by using Group Policy.

For more information about Group Policy, see the TechNet article, Group Policy collection. Note You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect. Impact of workaround.

There is no impact as long as the object is not intended to be used in Internet Explorer. How to undo the workaround. Delete the registry keys that were added in implementing this workaround.  Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Internet Explorer through Group Policy Note The Group Policy MMC snap-in can be used to set policy for a machine, for an organizational unit, or for an entire domain.

For more information about Group Policy, visit the following Microsoft Web sites: Group Policy Overview What is Group Policy Object Editor? Core Group Policy tools and settings To disable Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer through Group Policy, perform the following steps: Note This workaround does not prevent Flash from being invoked from other applications, such as Microsoft Office 2007 or Microsoft Office 2010. Open the Group Policy Management Console and configure the console to work with the appropriate Group Policy object, such as local machine, OU, or domain GPO. Navigate to the following node:Administrative Templates -> Windows Components -> Internet Explorer -> Security Features -> Add-on Management Double-click Turn off Adobe Flash in Internet Explorer and prevent applications from using Internet Explorer technology to instantiate Flash objects. Change the setting to Enabled. Click Apply and then click OK to return to the Group Policy Management Console. Refresh Group Policy on all systems or wait for the next scheduled Group Policy refresh interval for the settings to take effect.  Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Office 2010 on affected systems Note This workaround does not prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Internet Explorer. Warning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk. For detailed steps that you can use to prevent a control from running in Internet Explorer, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 240797.

Follow the steps in the article to create a Compatibility Flags value in the registry to prevent a COM object from being instantiated in Internet Explorer. To disable Adobe Flash Player in Office 2010 only, set the kill bit for the ActiveX control for Adobe Flash Player in the registry using the following steps: Create a text file named Disable_Flash.reg with the following contents: Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\Common\COM\Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 Double-click the .reg file to apply it to an individual system. Note You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect. You can also apply this workaround across domains by using Group Policy.

For more information about Group Policy, see the TechNet article, Group Policy collection. Prevent ActiveX controls from running in Office 2007 and Office 2010 To disable all ActiveX controls in Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010, including Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer, perform the following steps: Click File, click Options, click Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings. Click ActiveX Settings in the left-hand pane, and then select Disable all controls without notifications. Click OK to save your settings. Impact of workaround. Office documents that use embedded ActiveX controls may not display as intended. How to undo the workaround. To re-enable ActiveX controls in Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010, perform the following steps: Click File, click Options, click Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings. Click ActiveX Settings in the left-hand pane, and then deselect Disable all controls without notifications. Click OK to save your settings. Set Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones You can help protect against exploitation of these vulnerabilities by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High. To raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, perform the following steps: On the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options. In the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click Internet. Under Security level for this zone, move the slider to High.

This sets the security level for all websites you visit to High. Click Local intranet. Under Security level for this zone, move the slider to High.

This sets the security level for all websites you visit to High. Click OK to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer. Note If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High. Note Setting the level to High may cause some websites to work incorrectly.
If you have difficulty using a website after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites.

This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High. Impact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many websites on the Internet or an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality.

For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements.

Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites.
If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".   Configure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone You can help protect against exploitation of these vulnerabilities by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone.

To do this, perform the following steps: In Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu. Click the Security tab. Click Internet, and then click Custom Level. Under Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK. Click Local intranet, and then click Custom Level. Under Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK. Click OK to return to Internet Explorer, and then click OK again. Note Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some websites to work incorrectly.
If you have difficulty using a website after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites.

This will allow the site to work correctly. Impact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many websites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality.

For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround.

For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting.
If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".   Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone After you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone.

This will allow you to continue to use trusted websites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone. To do this, perform the following steps: In Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab. In the Select a web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites. If you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box. In the Add this website to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add. Repeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone. Click OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer. Note Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system.

Two sites in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com.

These are the sites that will host the update, and they require an ActiveX control to install the update. For Security Update Deployment information, see the Microsoft Knowledge Base article referenced here in the Executive Summary.Microsoft recognizes the efforts of those in the security community who help us protect customers through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.
See Acknowledgments for more information.The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.V1.0 (December 13, 2016): Bulletin published. Page generated 2016-12-13 9:58Z-08:00.
Gov Secure Internet to be revamped, world still on brink of digital destruction, etc etc The UK government’s first annual report on the implementation of the 2015 National Security Strategy has reaffirmed that cyber-security remains a key priority. The 39 page report (pdf) lists cyber-security alongside Russia’s actions in Syria and Ukraine and terrorism as among the greatest threats Britain faces. The range of cyber threats and cyber actors threatening the UK has grown significantly – both from state and non-state actors.

The UK increasingly relies on networked technology in all areas of society, business and government.

This means that we could be vulnerable to attacks on parts of networks that are essential for the day-to-day running of the country and the economy. The government goes on to say that it is “working with industry, especially communications service providers, to make it significantly harder to attack UK internet services and users, and to greatly reduce the prospects of successful attacks having a sustained impact on the UK”. The National Cyber Security Centre, which opened for business in October, will have a key role in co-ordinating response and developing best practice. May Day PM Theresa May's administration updated the National Cyber Security Strategy in November 2016.

The updated strategy - which did not contain any new spending pledges - is expected to include an increase in focus on investment in automated defences to combat malware and spam emails as well as a greater emphasis on building skills and research.

The revamped programme also places a greater emphasis on active cyber defence, a broad term that in practice means anything from running honeypot networks to hacking back against adversaries. We continue to invest in cyber detection and response, as attacks against the UK continue to rise. Over the last year, we have developed new technical capabilities to improve our ability to detect and analyse sophisticated cyber threats. Law enforcement continues to work with industry partners to increase specialist capability and expertise, as well as providing additional training in digital forensics. We are also continuing to progress our Active Cyber Defence measures against high-level threats, by strengthening UK networks against high volume/ low sophistication malware. The report unveiled plans, still only at the proof of concept stage, to develop a new secure cross-government network to “enable more efficient handling of national security matters”. No timetable was given for what might be described as the Government Secure Intranet (GSI) 2.0. Skills are always a key problem in the cyber security arena.

The UK government wants to promote cyber security education, starting with teenagers in schools and going all the way up to university programmes. A new Cyber Security Skills Strategy is now under development, which will set out how we will work with industry and academic providers to secure a pipeline of competent cyber security professionals. GCHQ’s CyberFirst scheme was established to identify, support and nurture the young cyber talent the UK will need in the digital age.
In 2016, we announced a major expansion to the scheme, including a programme in secondary schools, with the aim of having up to a thousand students involved by 2020.

The first cohort of 14-17 year olds will begin training under this programme in 2017. We are working with industry to establish specific cyber apprenticeships for three critical national infrastructure sectors: energy, finance and transport.

Acknowledging the key role universities play in skills development, we are also working to identify and support quality cyber graduate and postgraduate education, building on the certification programme for cyber security Masters courses, established by GCHQ. We are working to establish an active body to provide visible leadership and direction to the cyber security profession, and to advise, shape and inform national policy. Moving towards tackling cyber crime, the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the police have increased their numbers of ‘cyber specials’ working alongside law enforcement officers on cyber crime, and are “making good progress towards a target of 80 cyber specials in post by the end of March 2018”.

To tackle criminal use of the 'dark web', a new Dark Web Intelligence Unit has been established within the NCA, the report states. “The upgrade of its capability will continue throughout the 2016-17 financial year and beyond leading to significantly greater technical capability.

This will enable the use of multiple data sources, offer new and different types of analysis, and coordinate with multiple agencies to deal with issues at scale.” Back to more mundane matters, the UK government is also investing in regional cyber crime prevention coordinators, who “engage with SMEs and the public to provide bespoke cyber security advice”. On a related theme, UK.gov promised to promote its Cyber Essentials scheme to help businesses protect against common cyber threats. Although GCHQ and policing agencies are most vested in developing cyber security policies, the cyber arena also enters into the work of other government departments.

For example, the FCO’s £3.5m Cyber Security Capacity Building Programme is delivering a portfolio of 35 projects benefiting 70 countries to support the “openness and security of networks that extend beyond our own borders”. To help promote commercial endeavours in security the government is introducing two new cyber innovation centres based in Cheltenham and London; academic start-ups; a £10m Innovation Fund; a proving ground; and an SME boot camp. “GCHQ has reached out to industry and encouraged firms to invest in cyber security research through the CyberInvest programme which now has 25 industry members committed to investing millions of pounds in cyber security research at UK universities over the next five years,” the government report added. ® Sponsored: Want to know more about PAM? Visit The Register's hub
A new Massachusetts facility will help companies recover from attacks. A simulated version of the entire Internet is now live inside an IBM data center in Massachusetts, where the company plans to hold mock cyberattacks against large corporations. Th...
Security Update for Adobe Flash Player (3202790)Published: November 8, 2016Version: 1.0This security update resolves vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player when installed on all supported editions of Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016.This security update is rated Critical.

The update addresses the vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player by updating the affected Adobe Flash libraries contained within Internet Explorer 10, Internet Explorer 11, and Microsoft Edge.

For more information, see the Affected Software section.For more information about this update, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 3202790.This security update addresses the following vulnerabilities, which are described in Adobe Security Bulletin APSB16-37:CVE-2016-7857, CVE-2016-7858, CVE-2016-7859, CVE-2016-7860, CVE-2016-7861, CVE-2016-7862, CVE-2016-7863, CVE-2016-7864, CVE-2016-7865The following software versions or editions are affected.
Versions or editions that are not listed are either past their support life cycle or are not affected.

To determine the support life cycle for your software version or edition, see Microsoft Support Lifecycle. Operating System Component Aggregate Severity and Impact Updates Replaced*            Windows 8.1 Windows 8.1 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3202790) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3201860 in MS16-128 Windows 8.1 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3202790) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3201860 in MS16-128 Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2 Windows Server 2012 Adobe Flash Player(3202790) ModerateRemote Code Execution 3201860 in MS16-128 Windows Server 2012 R2 Adobe Flash Player(3202790) ModerateRemote Code Execution 3201860 in MS16-128 Windows RT 8.1 Windows RT 8.1 Adobe Flash Player(3202790)[1] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3201860 in MS16-128 Windows 10 Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3202790)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3201860 in MS16-128 Windows 10 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3202790)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3201860 in MS16-128 Windows 10 Version 1511 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3202790)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3201860 in MS16-128 Windows 10 Version 1511 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3202790)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3201860 in MS16-128 Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3202790)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3201860 in MS16-128 Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3202790)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3201860 in MS16-128 Windows Server 2016 Windows Server 2016 for 64-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3202790)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3201860 in MS16-128 [1]This update is available via Windows Update.[2]The Adobe Flash Player updates for Windows 10 updates are available via Windows Update or via the Microsoft Update Catalog.Note The vulnerabilities discussed in this bulletin affect Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview 5.

To be protected from the vulnerabilities, Microsoft recommends that customers running this operating system apply the current update, which is available exclusively from Windows Update.*The Updates Replaced column shows only the latest update in any chain of superseded updates.

For a comprehensive list of updates replaced, go to the Microsoft Update Catalog, search for the update KB number, and then view update details (updates replaced information is provided on the Package Details tab).How could an attacker exploit these vulnerabilities? In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer for the desktop, an attacker could host a specially crafted website that is designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker could also embed an ActiveX control marked "safe for initialization" in an application or Microsoft Office document that hosts the IE rendering engine.

The attacker could also take advantage of compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements.

These websites could contain specially crafted content that could exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email.In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer in the Windows 8-style UI, an attacker would first need to compromise a website already listed in the Compatibility View (CV) list.

An attacker could then host a website that contains specially crafted Flash content designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email.

For more information about Internet Explorer and the CV List, please see the MSDN Article, Developer Guidance for websites with content for Adobe Flash Player in Windows 8.Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability.

The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer for the desktop, an attacker could host a website that contains a webpage that is used to exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In addition, compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these websites.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the website, typically by getting them to click a link in an email message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website. Internet Explorer in the Windows 8-style UI will only play Flash content from sites listed on the Compatibility View (CV) list.

This restriction requires an attacker to first compromise a website already listed on the CV list.

An attacker could then host specially crafted Flash content designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email. By default, all supported versions of Microsoft Outlook and Windows Live Mail open HTML email messages in the Restricted sites zone.

The Restricted sites zone, which disables scripts and ActiveX controls, helps reduce the risk of an attacker being able to use any of these vulnerabilities to execute malicious code.
If a user clicks a link in an email message, the user could still be vulnerable to exploitation of any of these vulnerabilities through the web-based attack scenario. By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration.

This mode can help reduce the likelihood of the exploitation of these Adobe Flash Player vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer. Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update.Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running You can disable attempts to instantiate Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer and other applications that honor the kill bit feature, such as Office 2007 and Office 2010, by setting the kill bit for the control in the registry. Warning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk. To set the kill bit for the control in the registry, perform the following steps: Paste the following into a text file and save it with the .reg file extension. Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 Double-click the .reg file to apply it to an individual system.You can also apply this workaround across domains by using Group Policy.

For more information about Group Policy, see the TechNet article, Group Policy collection. Note You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect. Impact of workaround.

There is no impact as long as the object is not intended to be used in Internet Explorer. How to undo the workaround. Delete the registry keys that were added in implementing this workaround.  Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Internet Explorer through Group Policy Note The Group Policy MMC snap-in can be used to set policy for a machine, for an organizational unit, or for an entire domain.

For more information about Group Policy, visit the following Microsoft Web sites: Group Policy Overview What is Group Policy Object Editor? Core Group Policy tools and settings To disable Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer through Group Policy, perform the following steps: Note This workaround does not prevent Flash from being invoked from other applications, such as Microsoft Office 2007 or Microsoft Office 2010. Open the Group Policy Management Console and configure the console to work with the appropriate Group Policy object, such as local machine, OU, or domain GPO. Navigate to the following node:Administrative Templates -> Windows Components -> Internet Explorer -> Security Features -> Add-on Management Double-click Turn off Adobe Flash in Internet Explorer and prevent applications from using Internet Explorer technology to instantiate Flash objects. Change the setting to Enabled. Click Apply and then click OK to return to the Group Policy Management Console. Refresh Group Policy on all systems or wait for the next scheduled Group Policy refresh interval for the settings to take effect.  Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Office 2010 on affected systems Note This workaround does not prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Internet Explorer. Warning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk. For detailed steps that you can use to prevent a control from running in Internet Explorer, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 240797.

Follow the steps in the article to create a Compatibility Flags value in the registry to prevent a COM object from being instantiated in Internet Explorer. To disable Adobe Flash Player in Office 2010 only, set the kill bit for the ActiveX control for Adobe Flash Player in the registry using the following steps: Create a text file named Disable_Flash.reg with the following contents: Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\Common\COM\Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 Double-click the .reg file to apply it to an individual system. Note You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect. You can also apply this workaround across domains by using Group Policy.

For more information about Group Policy, see the TechNet article, Group Policy collection. Prevent ActiveX controls from running in Office 2007 and Office 2010 To disable all ActiveX controls in Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010, including Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer, perform the following steps: Click File, click Options, click Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings. Click ActiveX Settings in the left-hand pane, and then select Disable all controls without notifications. Click OK to save your settings. Impact of workaround. Office documents that use embedded ActiveX controls may not display as intended. How to undo the workaround. To re-enable ActiveX controls in Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010, perform the following steps: Click File, click Options, click Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings. Click ActiveX Settings in the left-hand pane, and then deselect Disable all controls without notifications. Click OK to save your settings. Set Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones You can help protect against exploitation of these vulnerabilities by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High. To raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, perform the following steps: On the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options. In the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click Internet. Under Security level for this zone, move the slider to High.

This sets the security level for all websites you visit to High. Click Local intranet. Under Security level for this zone, move the slider to High.

This sets the security level for all websites you visit to High. Click OK to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer. Note If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High. Note Setting the level to High may cause some websites to work incorrectly.
If you have difficulty using a website after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites.

This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High. Impact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many websites on the Internet or an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality.

For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements.

Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites.
If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".   Configure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone You can help protect against exploitation of these vulnerabilities by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone.

To do this, perform the following steps: In Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu. Click the Security tab. Click Internet, and then click Custom Level. Under Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK. Click Local intranet, and then click Custom Level. Under Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK. Click OK to return to Internet Explorer, and then click OK again. Note Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some websites to work incorrectly.
If you have difficulty using a website after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites.

This will allow the site to work correctly. Impact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many websites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality.

For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround.

For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting.
If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".   Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone After you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone.

This will allow you to continue to use trusted websites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone. To do this, perform the following steps: In Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab. In the Select a web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites. If you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box. In the Add this website to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add. Repeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone. Click OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer. Note Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system.

Two sites in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com.

These are the sites that will host the update, and they require an ActiveX control to install the update. For Security Update Deployment information, see the Microsoft Knowledge Base article referenced here in the Executive Summary.Microsoft recognizes the efforts of those in the security community who help us protect customers through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.
See Acknowledgments for more information.The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.V1.0 (November 8, 2016): Bulletin published. Page generated 2016-11-08 07:31-08:00.
Security Update for Adobe Flash Player (3201860)Published: October 27, 2016Version: 1.0This security update resolves a vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player when installed on all supported editions of Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, and Windows 10.This security update is rated Critical.

The update addresses the vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player by updating the affected Adobe Flash libraries contained within Internet Explorer 10, Internet Explorer 11, and Microsoft Edge.

For more information, see the Affected Software section.For more information about this update, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 3201860.This security update addresses the following vulnerabilities, which are described in Adobe Security Bulletin APSB16-36:CVE-2016-7855The following software versions or editions are affected.
Versions or editions that are not listed are either past their support life cycle or are not affected.

To determine the support life cycle for your software version or edition, see Microsoft Support Lifecycle. Operating System Component Aggregate Severity and Impact Updates Replaced*            Windows 8.1 Windows 8.1 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3201860) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3194343 in MS16-127 Windows 8.1 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3201860) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3194343 in MS16-127 Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2 Windows Server 2012 Adobe Flash Player(3201860) ModerateRemote Code Execution 3194343 in MS16-127 Windows Server 2012 R2 Adobe Flash Player(3201860) ModerateRemote Code Execution 3194343 in MS16-127 Windows RT 8.1 Windows RT 8.1 Adobe Flash Player(3201860)[1] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3194343 in MS16-127 Windows 10 Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3201860)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3194343 in MS16-127 Windows 10 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3201860)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3194343 in MS16-127 Windows 10 Version 1511 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3201860)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3194343 in MS16-127 Windows 10 Version 1511 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3201860)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3194343 in MS16-127 Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3201860)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3194343 in MS16-127 Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3201860)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3194343 in MS16-127 [1]This update is available via Windows Update.[2]The Adobe Flash Player updates for Windows 10 updates are available via Windows Update or via the Microsoft Update Catalog.Note The vulnerabilities discussed in this bulletin affect Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview 5.

To be protected from the vulnerabilities, Microsoft recommends that customers running this operating system apply the current update, which is available exclusively from Windows Update.*The Updates Replaced column shows only the latest update in any chain of superseded updates.

For a comprehensive list of updates replaced, go to the Microsoft Update Catalog, search for the update KB number, and then view update details (updates replaced information is provided on the Package Details tab).How could an attacker exploit these vulnerabilities? In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer for the desktop, an attacker could host a specially crafted website that is designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker could also embed an ActiveX control marked "safe for initialization" in an application or Microsoft Office document that hosts the IE rendering engine.

The attacker could also take advantage of compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements.

These websites could contain specially crafted content that could exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email.In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer in the Windows 8-style UI, an attacker would first need to compromise a website already listed in the Compatibility View (CV) list.

An attacker could then host a website that contains specially crafted Flash content designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email.

For more information about Internet Explorer and the CV List, please see the MSDN Article, Developer Guidance for websites with content for Adobe Flash Player in Windows 8.Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability.

The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer for the desktop, an attacker could host a website that contains a webpage that is used to exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In addition, compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these websites.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the website, typically by getting them to click a link in an email message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website. Internet Explorer in the Windows 8-style UI will only play Flash content from sites listed on the Compatibility View (CV) list.

This restriction requires an attacker to first compromise a website already listed on the CV list.

An attacker could then host specially crafted Flash content designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email. By default, all supported versions of Microsoft Outlook and Windows Live Mail open HTML email messages in the Restricted sites zone.

The Restricted sites zone, which disables scripts and ActiveX controls, helps reduce the risk of an attacker being able to use any of these vulnerabilities to execute malicious code.
If a user clicks a link in an email message, the user could still be vulnerable to exploitation of any of these vulnerabilities through the web-based attack scenario. By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration.

This mode can help reduce the likelihood of the exploitation of these Adobe Flash Player vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer. Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update.Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running You can disable attempts to instantiate Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer and other applications that honor the kill bit feature, such as Office 2007 and Office 2010, by setting the kill bit for the control in the registry. Warning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk. To set the kill bit for the control in the registry, perform the following steps: Paste the following into a text file and save it with the .reg file extension. Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 Double-click the .reg file to apply it to an individual system.You can also apply this workaround across domains by using Group Policy.

For more information about Group Policy, see the TechNet article, Group Policy collection. Note You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect. Impact of workaround.

There is no impact as long as the object is not intended to be used in Internet Explorer. How to undo the workaround. Delete the registry keys that were added in implementing this workaround.  Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Internet Explorer through Group Policy Note The Group Policy MMC snap-in can be used to set policy for a machine, for an organizational unit, or for an entire domain.

For more information about Group Policy, visit the following Microsoft Web sites: Group Policy Overview What is Group Policy Object Editor? Core Group Policy tools and settings To disable Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer through Group Policy, perform the following steps: Note This workaround does not prevent Flash from being invoked from other applications, such as Microsoft Office 2007 or Microsoft Office 2010. Open the Group Policy Management Console and configure the console to work with the appropriate Group Policy object, such as local machine, OU, or domain GPO. Navigate to the following node:Administrative Templates -> Windows Components -> Internet Explorer -> Security Features -> Add-on Management Double-click Turn off Adobe Flash in Internet Explorer and prevent applications from using Internet Explorer technology to instantiate Flash objects. Change the setting to Enabled. Click Apply and then click OK to return to the Group Policy Management Console. Refresh Group Policy on all systems or wait for the next scheduled Group Policy refresh interval for the settings to take effect.  Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Office 2010 on affected systems Note This workaround does not prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Internet Explorer. Warning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk. For detailed steps that you can use to prevent a control from running in Internet Explorer, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 240797.

Follow the steps in the article to create a Compatibility Flags value in the registry to prevent a COM object from being instantiated in Internet Explorer. To disable Adobe Flash Player in Office 2010 only, set the kill bit for the ActiveX control for Adobe Flash Player in the registry using the following steps: Create a text file named Disable_Flash.reg with the following contents: Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\Common\COM\Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 Double-click the .reg file to apply it to an individual system. Note You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect. You can also apply this workaround across domains by using Group Policy.

For more information about Group Policy, see the TechNet article, Group Policy collection. Prevent ActiveX controls from running in Office 2007 and Office 2010 To disable all ActiveX controls in Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010, including Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer, perform the following steps: Click File, click Options, click Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings. Click ActiveX Settings in the left-hand pane, and then select Disable all controls without notifications. Click OK to save your settings. Impact of workaround. Office documents that use embedded ActiveX controls may not display as intended. How to undo the workaround. To re-enable ActiveX controls in Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010, perform the following steps: Click File, click Options, click Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings. Click ActiveX Settings in the left-hand pane, and then deselect Disable all controls without notifications. Click OK to save your settings. Set Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones You can help protect against exploitation of these vulnerabilities by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High. To raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, perform the following steps: On the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options. In the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click Internet. Under Security level for this zone, move the slider to High.

This sets the security level for all websites you visit to High. Click Local intranet. Under Security level for this zone, move the slider to High.

This sets the security level for all websites you visit to High. Click OK to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer. Note If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High. Note Setting the level to High may cause some websites to work incorrectly.
If you have difficulty using a website after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites.

This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High. Impact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many websites on the Internet or an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality.

For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements.

Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites.
If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".   Configure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone You can help protect against exploitation of these vulnerabilities by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone.

To do this, perform the following steps: In Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu. Click the Security tab. Click Internet, and then click Custom Level. Under Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK. Click Local intranet, and then click Custom Level. Under Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK. Click OK to return to Internet Explorer, and then click OK again. Note Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some websites to work incorrectly.
If you have difficulty using a website after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites.

This will allow the site to work correctly. Impact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many websites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality.

For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround.

For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting.
If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".   Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone After you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone.

This will allow you to continue to use trusted websites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone. To do this, perform the following steps: In Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab. In the Select a web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites. If you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box. In the Add this website to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add. Repeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone. Click OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer. Note Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system.

Two sites in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com.

These are the sites that will host the update, and they require an ActiveX control to install the update. For Security Update Deployment information, see the Microsoft Knowledge Base article referenced here in the Executive Summary.Microsoft recognizes the efforts of those in the security community who help us protect customers through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.
See Acknowledgments for more information.The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.V1.0 (October 26, 2016): Bulletin published. Page generated 2016-10-27 9:19Z-07:00.
Security Update for Adobe Flash Player (3194343)Published: October 11, 2016Version: 1.0This security update resolves vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player when installed on all supported editions of Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, and Windows 10.This security update is rated Critical.

The update addresses the vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player by updating the affected Adobe Flash libraries contained within Internet Explorer 10, Internet Explorer 11, and Microsoft Edge.

For more information, see the Affected Software section.For more information about this update, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 3194343.This security update addresses the following vulnerabilities, which are described in Adobe Security Bulletin APSB16-32:CVE-2016-4273, CVE-2016-4286, CVE-2016-6981, CVE-2016-6982, CVE-2016-6983, CVE-2016-6984, CVE-2016-6985, CVE-2016-6986, CVE-2016-6987, CVE-2016-6989, CVE-2016-6990, CVE-2016-6991, CVE-2016-6992The following software versions or editions are affected.
Versions or editions that are not listed are either past their support life cycle or are not affected.

To determine the support life cycle for your software version or edition, see Microsoft Support Lifecycle. Operating System Component Aggregate Severity and Impact Updates Replaced*            Windows 8.1 Windows 8.1 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3194343) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3188128 in MS16-117 Windows 8.1 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3194343) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3188128 in MS16-117 Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2 Windows Server 2012 Adobe Flash Player(3194343) ModerateRemote Code Execution 3188128 in MS16-117 Windows Server 2012 R2 Adobe Flash Player(3194343) ModerateRemote Code Execution 3188128 in MS16-117 Windows RT 8.1 Windows RT 8.1 Adobe Flash Player(3194343)[1] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3188128 in MS16-117 Windows 10 Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3194343)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3188128 in MS16-117 Windows 10 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3194343)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3188128 in MS16-117 Windows 10 Version 1511 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3194343)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3188128 in MS16-117 Windows 10 Version 1511 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3194343)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3188128 in MS16-117 Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3194343)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3188128 in MS16-117 Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3194343)[2] CriticalRemote Code Execution 3188128 in MS16-117 [1]This update is available via Windows Update.[2]The Adobe Flash Player updates for Windows 10 updates are available via Windows Update or via the Microsoft Update Catalog.Note The vulnerabilities discussed in this bulletin affect Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview 5.

To be protected from the vulnerabilities, Microsoft recommends that customers running this operating system apply the current update, which is available exclusively from Windows Update.*The Updates Replaced column shows only the latest update in any chain of superseded updates.

For a comprehensive list of updates replaced, go to the Microsoft Update Catalog, search for the update KB number, and then view update details (updates replaced information is provided on the Package Details tab).How could an attacker exploit these vulnerabilities? In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer for the desktop, an attacker could host a specially crafted website that is designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker could also embed an ActiveX control marked "safe for initialization" in an application or Microsoft Office document that hosts the IE rendering engine.

The attacker could also take advantage of compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements.

These websites could contain specially crafted content that could exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email.In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer in the Windows 8-style UI, an attacker would first need to compromise a website already listed in the Compatibility View (CV) list.

An attacker could then host a website that contains specially crafted Flash content designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email.

For more information about Internet Explorer and the CV List, please see the MSDN Article, Developer Guidance for websites with content for Adobe Flash Player in Windows 8.Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability.

The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer for the desktop, an attacker could host a website that contains a webpage that is used to exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In addition, compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these websites.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the website, typically by getting them to click a link in an email message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website. Internet Explorer in the Windows 8-style UI will only play Flash content from sites listed on the Compatibility View (CV) list.

This restriction requires an attacker to first compromise a website already listed on the CV list.

An attacker could then host specially crafted Flash content designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email. By default, all supported versions of Microsoft Outlook and Windows Live Mail open HTML email messages in the Restricted sites zone.

The Restricted sites zone, which disables scripts and ActiveX controls, helps reduce the risk of an attacker being able to use any of these vulnerabilities to execute malicious code.
If a user clicks a link in an email message, the user could still be vulnerable to exploitation of any of these vulnerabilities through the web-based attack scenario. By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration.

This mode can help reduce the likelihood of the exploitation of these Adobe Flash Player vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer. Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update.Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running You can disable attempts to instantiate Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer and other applications that honor the kill bit feature, such as Office 2007 and Office 2010, by setting the kill bit for the control in the registry. Warning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk. To set the kill bit for the control in the registry, perform the following steps: Paste the following into a text file and save it with the .reg file extension. Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 Double-click the .reg file to apply it to an individual system.You can also apply this workaround across domains by using Group Policy.

For more information about Group Policy, see the TechNet article, Group Policy collection. Note You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect. Impact of workaround.

There is no impact as long as the object is not intended to be used in Internet Explorer. How to undo the workaround. Delete the registry keys that were added in implementing this workaround.  Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Internet Explorer through Group Policy Note The Group Policy MMC snap-in can be used to set policy for a machine, for an organizational unit, or for an entire domain.

For more information about Group Policy, visit the following Microsoft Web sites: Group Policy Overview What is Group Policy Object Editor? Core Group Policy tools and settings To disable Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer through Group Policy, perform the following steps: Note This workaround does not prevent Flash from being invoked from other applications, such as Microsoft Office 2007 or Microsoft Office 2010. Open the Group Policy Management Console and configure the console to work with the appropriate Group Policy object, such as local machine, OU, or domain GPO. Navigate to the following node:Administrative Templates -> Windows Components -> Internet Explorer -> Security Features -> Add-on Management Double-click Turn off Adobe Flash in Internet Explorer and prevent applications from using Internet Explorer technology to instantiate Flash objects. Change the setting to Enabled. Click Apply and then click OK to return to the Group Policy Management Console. Refresh Group Policy on all systems or wait for the next scheduled Group Policy refresh interval for the settings to take effect.  Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Office 2010 on affected systems Note This workaround does not prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Internet Explorer. Warning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk. For detailed steps that you can use to prevent a control from running in Internet Explorer, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 240797.

Follow the steps in the article to create a Compatibility Flags value in the registry to prevent a COM object from being instantiated in Internet Explorer. To disable Adobe Flash Player in Office 2010 only, set the kill bit for the ActiveX control for Adobe Flash Player in the registry using the following steps: Create a text file named Disable_Flash.reg with the following contents: Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\Common\COM\Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 Double-click the .reg file to apply it to an individual system. Note You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect. You can also apply this workaround across domains by using Group Policy.

For more information about Group Policy, see the TechNet article, Group Policy collection. Prevent ActiveX controls from running in Office 2007 and Office 2010 To disable all ActiveX controls in Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010, including Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer, perform the following steps: Click File, click Options, click Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings. Click ActiveX Settings in the left-hand pane, and then select Disable all controls without notifications. Click OK to save your settings. Impact of workaround. Office documents that use embedded ActiveX controls may not display as intended. How to undo the workaround. To re-enable ActiveX controls in Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010, perform the following steps: Click File, click Options, click Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings. Click ActiveX Settings in the left-hand pane, and then deselect Disable all controls without notifications. Click OK to save your settings. Set Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones You can help protect against exploitation of these vulnerabilities by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High. To raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, perform the following steps: On the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options. In the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click Internet. Under Security level for this zone, move the slider to High.

This sets the security level for all websites you visit to High. Click Local intranet. Under Security level for this zone, move the slider to High.

This sets the security level for all websites you visit to High. Click OK to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer. Note If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High. Note Setting the level to High may cause some websites to work incorrectly.
If you have difficulty using a website after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites.

This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High. Impact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many websites on the Internet or an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality.

For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements.

Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites.
If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".   Configure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone You can help protect against exploitation of these vulnerabilities by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone.

To do this, perform the following steps: In Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu. Click the Security tab. Click Internet, and then click Custom Level. Under Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK. Click Local intranet, and then click Custom Level. Under Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK. Click OK to return to Internet Explorer, and then click OK again. Note Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some websites to work incorrectly.
If you have difficulty using a website after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites.

This will allow the site to work correctly. Impact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many websites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality.

For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround.

For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting.
If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".   Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone After you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone.

This will allow you to continue to use trusted websites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone. To do this, perform the following steps: In Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab. In the Select a web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites. If you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box. In the Add this website to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add. Repeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone. Click OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer. Note Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system.

Two sites in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com.

These are the sites that will host the update, and they require an ActiveX control to install the update. For Security Update Deployment information, see the Microsoft Knowledge Base article referenced here in the Executive Summary.Microsoft recognizes the efforts of those in the security community who help us protect customers through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.
See Acknowledgments for more information.The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.V1.0 (October 11, 2016): Bulletin published. Page generated 2016-10-06 13:38-07:00.
Secure Cloudlink enables enterprise-wide secure access to Office 365 across 22 offices across four continents reducing risk and cost through the elimination of passwordsAbout InstinctifWith 22 global offices, six based in the UK and a headcount of over 400 worldwide, Instinctif Partners, the international communications consultancy has seen consistent growth over the past decade.
Its latest reported figures show global turnover well in excess of £40m. 2014 saw the start of what was to be a pivotal time for the business, starting with it shedding its College Group name, associated with it since its formation in 1990 as financial PR firm Collage Hill.

The London HQ also moved from the Royal Mint Court to its current location in Gresham Street in the City of London in February 2014. The aim of the rebrand was to unite the business under one name enabling it to go head to head with global competitors.
Instinctif has grown both organically and through a number of acquisitions, enabling the extension of its geographic reach into expanding markets such as Asia Pac and the Middle East, including China and Dubai. Michael Plant, IT Director, stated: “Through the recent period of considerable growth our focus as a people business was to ensure the rapid integration of our people and the business itself. Rebranding was an essential first step in that journey, as we wanted to ensure all our talent felt that they were part of a global organisation.” The ChallengeWhile the emphasis within the business focused on its people, there remained a highly disparate IT estate.

The siloed IT infrastructure was the direct result of the programme of acquisitions the business as a whole undertook as it grew. While people, brand and business processes were gradually brought under one umbrella, the IT infrastructure and applications that underpinned the business remained far from integrated. “We are a people business. Not only is our greatest resource our own employees but we are a communications company and that inherently means that we are dealing with human beings.

The business recognised very early on that it needed to revolve around the needs of its staff and not the needs of IT and that has fundamentally driven our investment approach throughout the group,” stated Michael. Instinctif embarked on a program of enterprise-wide systems reengineering to integrate the disparate IT systems throughout the group.

Critical to this process was the need to ensure that the group’s employees felt part of the same company, no matter where they were geographically based, and no matter what the legacy company was. “The group had already taken the decision to look into the idea of a single sign on (SSO) solution for employees to access certain group-wide applications such as Office 365 and our email archive solution Mimecast, as well as our enterprise-wide intranet.

At the time we were working with Okta. We then began the process of rolling out a new hosted, Cloud based HR solution from UK vendor Octopus HR, which in turn had a long-standing relationship with another UK specialist security vendor, Secure Cloudlink Ltd. “It made sense to focus on the global roll-out of an effective HR solution that bought together everything from payroll to timesheet management, expenses management and performance.

At the end of the day we needed a global solution to help us manage our global accounts because the value of our business resides in our people” continued Michael. The Group had already settled on UK based Octopus HR, a flexible, secure and easy-to-use hosted online HR system.
Its core platform is a self-service hub from which additional modules operate such as payroll. Octopus HR in turn works with British cloud security software company SCL Ltd which has developed a three factor, SSO and biometric user authentication solution – Secure Cloudlink. The SolutionSecure Cloudlink acts as a secure, centralised user authentication and application to manage all users access rights to all authorised applications without the need to create and manage internal domains. Unlike other solutions in the market, Secure Cloudlink does not store, send or replicate any user credentials outside of an organisations’ directory service. “The IT department was faced with an interesting dilemma. While we retained the option to review Secure Cloudlink, it was clear the business wanted to migrate to Octopus at the earliest opportunity.

To be clear we needn’t have worried.” Designed from the ground up with security in mind Secure Cloudlink’s Cloud Services Brokerage platform overcomes identity security issues associated with passwords by the inclusion of a unique and patented token passing technology.

This advanced authentication method requires no user credentials to be stored separately or outside of the directory service, therefore dramatically reducing the risk of a cyber breach and costs associated with password reminders. Michael continued: “Our overwhelming objective for the business was to develop an intranet front end with a single portal to enable all employees to access all enterprise wide business systems including Office 365 and email.

The challenge for us was to roll this out across all 22 offices; something we believed could not be done with Okta. Our solution was to tie SSO and usernames together so that when a user types in their email address it authenticates via the Octopus HR system, validating them and granting them secure access to the corporate intranet via the portal.” Secure Cloudlink is the only platform that anonymises user identities over the web for secure access to cloud services.
Its unique technology never requires access or stores user security credentials when connecting internal users, customers and suppliers to web-based applications. With a secure single-sign-on Secure Cloudlink reduces IT service desk time managing multiple passwords by deploying users with a single, secure access point for access to their applications via their desktop, tablet or mobile. The ResultToday the group IT function resides at Instinctif’s Gresham Street HQ.
It is solely responsible for IT infrastructure and software applications.
It is also home to the group HR function which is responsible for the onboarding and validation of new employees, as well as the decommissioning of email and passwords associated with former employees. “We have witnessed high levels of user acceptance.

A single sign on solution has helped not only the HR and IT teams deliver an enhanced user experience, it has done so within a highly secure environment, something that is of paramount importance to our clients.

Given the fact that we operate in corporate reputation management, Secure Cloudlink has delivered for us a solution that reduces risk while at the same time has cut the costs associated with IT helpdesk queries over passwords,” continued Michael. The Secure Cloudlink platform has also proven to be hugely flexible delivering bespoke solutions to support the in-house designers who were tasked with the development of the Intranet and portal in the first instance. “The help we received from the SCL team as we developed this solutions was second to none. We genuinely believe that this was a working partnership, where we received support right from the implementation process, all the way through to the development of bespoke applications as we progressed, something we do not believe with hindsight we could have done with Okta,” added Michael. “Security within the business is today not only strong but far easier to manage from the businesses perspective and the users! An enterprise wide portal accessed via SSO now drives all access to the corporate systems eliminating the risk and costs associated with managing passwords. HR – and the role it undertakes in terms of employee validation and security – now handles the authentication process. User acceptance is widespread and is key to our drive to becoming one company with one IT infrastructure, globally,” concluded Michael. About Secure Cloudlink Ltd – no passwordsSecure Cloudlink Ltd is a UK based cloud security software company determined to make passwords obsolete. Secure Cloudlink uniquely eliminates the security risks, administration costs, license abuse or user frustrations associated with issuing and maintaining passwords. The patented token technology built into Secure Cloudlink does not transmit, store or replicate user credentials anywhere and supports third party multi-factor, biometric or single sign on (SSO) technology. Our customers include government, SaaS providers, financial institutions and is applicable to any organisation needing to provides simple yet secure access to cloud and on-premise applications or services. ContactsRob GaskinSecure Cloudlink LtdT: +44 (0)1372 888 660E: rob.gaskin@securecloudlink.comBeau Bass/Nick Bird (media enquires)SpreckleyTel: 0044 (0)207 388 9988Email: securecloudlink@spreckley.co.uk
 Download the full report (PDF) Technical analysis Indicators of compromise (IOC)Download YARA rules More information about ProjectSauron is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service.

Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Introduction: Over the last few years, the number of “APT-related” incidents described in the media has grown significantly.

For many of these, though, the designation “APT”, indicating an “Advanced Persistent Threat”, is usually an exaggeration. With some notable exceptions, few of the threat actors usually described in the media are advanced.

These exceptions, which in our opinion represent the pinnacle of cyberespionage tools: the truly “advanced” threat actors out there, are Equation, Regin, Duqu or Careto.

Another such an exceptional espionage platform is “ProjectSauron”, also known as “Strider”. What differentiates a truly advanced threat actor from a wannabe APT? Here are a few features that characterize the ‘top’ cyberespionage groups: The use of zero day exploits Unknown, never identified infection vectors Have compromised multiple government organizations in several countries Have successfully stolen information for many years before being discovered Have the ability to steal information from air gapped networks Support multiple covert exfiltration channels on various protocols Malware modules which can exist only in memory without touching the disk Unusual persistence techniques which sometime use undocumented OS features “ProjectSauron” easily covers many of these points. From discovery to detection: When talking about long-standing cyber-espionage campaigns, many people wonder why it took so long to catch them. Perhaps one of the explanations is having the right tools for the right job.

Trying to catch government or military grade malware requires specialized technologies and products. One such product is Kaspersky’s AntiTargeted Attacks Platform, KATA (http://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/anti-targeted-attack-platform).
In September 2015, our anti-targeted attack technologies caught a previously unknown attack.

The suspicious module was an executable library, loaded in the memory of a Windows domain controller (DC).

The library was registered as a Windows password filter and had access to sensitive data in cleartext.

Additional research revealed signs of massive activity from a new threat actor that we codenamed ‘ProjectSauron’, responsible for large-scale attacks against key governmental entities in several countries. “SAURON” – internal name used in the LUA scripts ProjectSauron comprises a top-of-the-top modular cyber-espionage platform in terms of technical sophistication, designed to enable long-term campaigns through stealthy survival mechanisms coupled with multiple exfiltration methods.

Technical details show how attackers learned from other extremely advanced actors in order to avoid repeating their mistakes.

For example, all artifacts are customized per given target, reducing their value as indicators of compromise for any other victim. Some other key features of ProjectSauron: It is a modular platform designed to enable long-term cyber-espionage campaigns. All modules and network protocols use strong encryption algorithms, such as RC6, RC5, RC4, AES, Salsa20, etc. It uses a modified LUA scripting engine to implement the core platform and its plugins. There are upwards of 50 different plugin types. The actor behind ProjectSauron has a high interest in communication encryption software widely used by targeted governmental organizations.
It steals encryption keys, configuration files, and IP addresses of the key infrastructure servers related to the encryption software. It is able to exfiltrate data from air-gapped networks by using specially-prepared USB storage drives where data is stored in an area invisible to the operation system. The platform makes extensive use of the DNS protocol for data exfiltration and real-time status reporting. The APT was operational as early as June 2011 and remained active until April 2016. The initial infection vector used to penetrate victim networks remains unknown. The attackers utilize legitimate software distribution channels for lateral movement within infected networks. To help our readers better understand the ProjectSauron attack platform, we’ve prepared an FAQ which brings together some of the most important points about this attacker and its tools.

A brief technical report is also available, including IOCs and Yara rules. Our colleagues from Symantec have also released their analysis on ProjectSauron / Strider. You can read it here: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets ProjectSauron FAQ: 1. What is ProjectSauron? ProjectSauron is the name for a top level modular cyber-espionage platform, designed to enable and manage long-term campaigns through stealthy survival mechanisms coupled with multiple exfiltration methods. Technical details show how attackers learned from other extremely advanced actors in order to avoid repeating their mistakes.

As such, all artifacts are customized per given target, reducing their value as indicators of compromise for any other victim. Usually APT campaigns have a geographical nexus, aimed at extracting information within a specific region or from a given industry.

That usually results in several infections in countries within that region, or in the targeted industry around the world.
Interestingly, ProjectSauron seems to be dedicated to just a couple of countries, focused on collecting high value intelligence by compromising almost all key entities it could possibly reach within the target area. The name, ProjectSauron reflects the fact that the code authors refer to ‘Sauron’ in the LUA scripts. 2. Who are the victims? Using our telemetry, we found more than 30 infected organizations in Russia, Iran, Rwanda and possibly in Italian-speaking countries as well. Many more organizations and geographies are likely to be affected. The attacked organizations are key entities that provide core state functions: Government Scientific research centers Military Telecommunication providers Finance 3. Have you notified victims? As usual, Kaspersky Lab actively collaborates with industry partners, CERTs and law enforcement agencies to notify victims and help to mitigate the threat. We also rely on public awareness to spread information about it.
If you need more information about this actor, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com. 4.

For how long have the attackers been active? Forensic analysis indicates that the APT has been operational since at least June 2011 and was still active in 2016.

Although it appears to have largely ceased, there is a chance that it is still active on computer systems that are not covered by Kaspersky Lab solutions. 5.

Did the attackers use interesting or advanced techniques? The attackers used multiple interesting and unusual techniques, including: Data exfiltration and real-time status reporting using DNS requests. Implant deployment using legitimate software update scripts. Data exfiltration from air-gapped networks through the use of specially prepared USB storage drives where the stolen data is stored in the area unused by standard tools of the operating system. Using a modified LUA scripting engine to implement the core platform and its plugins.

The use of LUA components in malware is very rare – it was previously spotted in the Flame and Animal Farm attacks. 6. How did you discover this malware? In September 2015, Kaspersky Lab’s Anti-Targeted Attack Platform discovered anomalous network traffic in a client organization’s network.

Analysis of this incident led to the discovery of a strange executable program library loaded into the memory of the domain controller server.

The library was registered as a Windows password filter and had access to sensitive data such as administrative passwords in cleartext.

Additional research revealed signs of activity of a previously unknown threat actor. 7. How does ProjectSauron operate? ProjectSauron usually registers its persistence module on domain controllers as a Windows LSA (Local Security Authority) password filter.

This feature is typically used by system administrators to enforce password policies and validate new passwords to match specific requirements, such as length and complexity.

This way, the ProjectSauron passive backdoor module starts every time any network or local user (including an administrator) logs in or changes a password, and promptly harvests the password in plaintext. In cases where domain controllers lack direct Internet access, the attackers install additional implants on other local servers which have both local network and Internet access and may pass through significant amount of network traffic, i.e. proxy-servers, web-servers, or software update servers.

After that, these intermediary servers are used by ProjectSauron as internal proxy nodes for silent and inconspicuous data exfiltration, blending in with high volumes of legitimate traffic. Once installed, the main ProjectSauron modules start working as ‘sleeper cells’, displaying no activity of their own and waiting for ‘wake-up’ commands in the incoming network traffic.

This method of operation ensures ProjectSauron’s extended persistence on the servers of targeted organizations. 8. What kind of implants does ProjectSauron use? Most of ProjectSauron’s core implants are designed to work as backdoors, downloading new modules or running commands from the attacker purely in memory.

The only way to capture these modules is by making a full memory dump of the infected systems. Almost all of ProjectSauron’s core implants are unique, have different file names and sizes, and are individually built for each target.

Each module’s timestamp, both in the file system and in its own headers, is tailored to the environment on which it is installed. Secondary ProjectSauron modules are designed to perform specific functions like stealing documents, recording keystrokes, and stealing encryption keys from both infected computers and attached USB sticks. ProjectSauron implements a modular architecture using its own virtual file system to store additional modules (plugins) and a modified LUA interpreter to execute internal scripts.

There are upwards of 50 different plugin types. 9. What is the initial infection vector? To date, the initial infection vector used by ProjectSauron to penetrate victim networks remains unknown. 10. How were the ProjectSauron implants deployed within the target network? In several cases, ProjectSauron modules were deployed through the modification of scripts used by system administrators to centrally deploy legitimate software updates within the network. In essence, the attackers injected a command to start the malware by modifying existing software deployment scripts.

The injected malware is a tiny module that works as a simple downloader. Once started under a network administrator account, this small downloader connects to a hard-coded internal or external IP address and downloads the bigger ProjectSauron payload from there. In cases where the ProjectSauron persistence container is stored on disk in EXE file format, it disguises the files with legitimate software file names. 11. What C&C infrastructure did the attackers use? The ProjectSauron actor is extremely well prepared when it comes to operational security. Running an expensive cyberespionage campaign like ProjectSauron requires vast domain and server infrastructure uniquely assigned to each victim organization and never reused again.

This makes traditional network-based indicators of compromise almost useless because they won’t be reused in any other organization. We collected 28 domains linked to 11 IPs located in the United States and several European countries that might be connected to ProjectSauron campaigns.

Even the diversity of ISPs selected for ProjectSauron operations makes it clear that the actor did everything possible to avoid creating patterns. 12.

Does ProjectSauron target isolated (air-gapped) networks? Yes. We registered a few cases where ProjectSauron successfully penetrated air-gapped networks. The ProjectSauron toolkit contains a special module designed to move data from air-gapped networks to Internet-connected systems.

To achieve this, removable USB devices are used. Once networked systems are compromised, the attackers wait for a USB drive to be attached to the infected machine. These USBs are specially formatted to reduce the size of the partition on the USB disk, reserving an amount of hidden data (several hundred megabytes) at the end of the disk for malicious purposes.

This reserved space is used to create a new custom-encrypted partition that won’t be recognized by a common OS, such as Windows.

The partition has its own semi-filesystem (or virtual file system, VFS) with two core directories: ‘In’ and ‘Out’. This method also bypasses many DLP products, since software that disables the plugging of unknown USB devices based on DeviceID wouldn’t prevent an attack or data leakage, because a genuine recognized USB drive was used. 13.

Does ProjectSauron target critical infrastructure? Some of the entities infected by ProjectSauron can be classified as critical infrastructure. However, we haven’t registered ProjectSauron infections inside industrial control system networks that have SCADA systems in place. Also, we have not yet seen a ProjectSauron module targeting any specific industrial hardware or software. 14.

Did ProjectSauron use any special communication methods? For network communication, the ProjectSauron toolkit has extensive abilities, leveraging the stack of the most commonly used protocols: ICMP, UDP, TCP, DNS, SMTP and HTTP. One of the ProjectSauron plugins is the DNS data exfiltration tool.

To avoid generic detection of DNS tunnels at network level, the attackers use it in low-bandwidth mode, which is why it is used solely to exfiltrate target system metadata. Another interesting feature in ProjectSauron malware that leverages the DNS protocol is the real-time reporting of the operation progress to a remote server. Once an operational milestone is achieved, ProjectSauron issues a DNS-request to a special subdomain unique to each target. 15. What is the most sophisticated feature of the ProjectSauron APT? In general, the ProjectSauron platform is very advanced and reaches the level of complexity of Regin, Equation and similar threat actors we have reported on in the past.
Some of the most interesting things in the ProjectSauron platform include: Multiple exfiltration mechanisms, including piggybacking on known protocols. Bypassing air-gaps using hidden data partitions on USB sticks. Hijacking Windows LSA to control network domain servers. Implementing an extended LUA engine to write custom malicious scripts to control the entire malware platform with a high-level language. 16.

Are the attackers using any zero-day vulnerabilities? To date we have not found any 0-day exploits associated with ProjectSauron. However, when penetrating isolated systems, the creation of the encrypted storage area in the USB does not in itself enable attackers to get control of the air-gapped machines.

There has to be another component such as a 0­day exploit placed on the main partition of the USB drive. So far we have not found any 0-day exploit embedded in the body of the malware we analyzed, and we believe it was probably deployed in rare, hard-to-catch instances. 17.
Is this a Windows-only threat? What versions of Windows are targeted? ProjectSauron works on all modern Microsoft Windows operating systems – both x64 and x86. We have witnessed infections running on Windows XP x86 as well as Windows 2012 R2 Server Edition x64. To date, we haven’t found a non-Windows version of ProjectSauron. 18. Were the attackers hunting for specific information? ProjectSauron actively searches for information related to rather uncommon, custom network encryption software.

This client-server software is widely adopted by many of the target organizations to secure communications, voice, email, and document exchange. In a number of the cases we analyzed, ProjectSauron deployed malicious modules inside the custom network encryption’s software directory, disguised under similar filenames and accessing the data placed beside its own executable.
Some of extracted LUA scripts show that the attackers have a high interest in the software components, keys, configuration files, and the location of servers that relay encrypted messages between the nodes. Also, one of the embedded ProjectSauron configurations contains a special unique identifier for the targeted network encryption software’s server within its virtual network.

The behavior of the component that searches for the server IP address is unusual.

After getting the IP, the ProjectSauron component tries to communicate with the remote server using its own (ProjectSauron) protocol as if it was yet another C&C server.

This suggests that some communication servers running the mentioned network encryption software could also be infected with ProjectSauron. 19. What exactly is being stolen from the targeted machines? The ProjectSauron modules we found are able to steal documents, record keystrokes and steal encryption keys from infected computers and attached USB sticks. The fragment of configuration block below, extracted from ProjectSauron, shows the kind of information and file extensions the attackers were looking for: .*account.*|.*acct.*|.*domain.*|.*login.*|.*member.*|.*user.*|.*name|.*email|.*_id|id|uid|mn|mailaddress|.*nick.*|alias|codice|uin|sign-in|strCodUtente|.*pass.*|.*pw|pw.*|additional_info|.*secret.*|.*segreto.*[^\$]$ ^.*\.(doc|xls|pdf)$ *.txt;*.doc;*.docx;*.ppt;*.pptx;*.xls;*.xlsx;*.vsd;*.wab;*.pdf;*.dst;*.ppk;*.rsa;*.rar;*.one;*.rtf;~WPL*.tmp;*.FTS;*.rpt;*.conf;*.cfg;*.pk2;*.nct;*.key;*.psw Interestingly, while most of the words and extensions above are in the English language, several of them point to Italian, such as: ‘codice’, ‘strCodUtente’ and ‘segreto’. Keywords / filenames targeted by ProjectSauron data theft modules: Italian keyword Translation Codice code CodUtente Usercode Segreto Secret This suggests the attackers had prepared to attack Italian-speaking targets as well. However, we are not aware of any Italian victims of ProjectSauron at the moment. 20. Have you observed any artifacts indicating who is behind the ProjectSauron APT? Attribution is hard and reliable attribution is rarely possible in cyberspace.

Even with confidence in various indicators and apparent attacker mistakes, there is a greater likelihood that these are smoke and mirrors created by an attacker with a greater vantage point and vast resources. When dealing with the most advanced threat actors, as is the case with ProjectSauron, attribution becomes an unsolvable problem. 21.
Is this a nation-state sponsored attack? We think an operation of such complexity, aimed at stealing confidential and secret information, can only be executed with support from a nation-state. 22. What would ProjectSauron have cost to set up and run? Kaspersky Lab has no exact data on this, but estimates that the development and operation of ProjectSauron is likely to have required several specialist teams and a budget probably running into millions of dollars. 23. How does the ProjectSauron platform compare to other top-level threat actors? The actor behind ProjectSauron is very advanced, comparable only to the top-of-the-top in terms of sophistication: alongside Duqu, Flame, Equation, and Regin. Whether related or unrelated to these advanced actors, the ProjectSauron attackers have definitely learned from them. As a reminder, here are some features of other APT attackers which we discovered that the ProjectSauron attackers had carefully learned from or emulated: Duqu: Use of intranet C&Cs (where compromised target servers may act as independent C&Cs) Running only in memory (persistence on a few gateway hosts only) Use of different encryption methods per victim Use of named pipes for LAN communication Malware distribution through legitimate software deployment channels Flame: LUA-embedded code Secure file deletion (through data wiping) Attacking air-gapped systems via removable devices Equation and Regin: Usage of RC5/RC6 encryption Virtual Filesystems (VFS) Attacking air-gapped systems via removable devices Hidden data storage on removable devices These other actors also showed what made them vulnerable to potential exposure, and ProjectSauron did its best to address these issues: Vulnerable or persistent C&C locations ISP name, IP, domain, and tools reuse across different campaigns Crypto-algorithm reuse (as well as encryption keys) Forensic footprint on disk Timestamps in various components Large volumes of exfiltrated data, alarming unknown protocols or message formats In addition, it appears that the attackers took special care with what we consider as indicators of compromise and implemented a unique pattern for each and every target they attacked, so that the same indicators would have little value for anyone else.

This is a summary of the ProjectSauron strategy as we see it.

The attackers clearly understand that we as researchers are always looking for patterns. Remove the patterns and the operation will be harder to discover. We are aware of more than 30 organizations attacked, but we are sure that this is just a tiny tip of the iceberg. 24.

Do Kaspersky Lab products detect all variants of this malware? All Kaspersky Lab products detect ProjectSauron samples as HEUR:Trojan.Multi.Remsec.gen 25.

Are there Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) to help victims identify the intrusion? ProjectSauron’s tactics are designed to avoid creating patterns.
Implants and infrastructure are customized for each individual target and never re-used – so the standard security approach of publishing and checking for the same basic indicators of compromise (IOC) is of little use. However, structural code similarities are inevitable, especially for non-compressed and non-encrypted code.

This opens up the possibility of recognizing known code in some cases. That’s why, alongside the formal IOCs, we have added relevant YARA rules. While the IOCs have been listed mainly to give examples of what they look like, the YARA rules are likely to be of greater use and could detect real traces of ProjectSauron. For background: YARA is a tool for uncovering malicious files or patterns of suspicious activity on systems or networks that share similarities. YARA rules—basically search strings—help analysts to find, group, and categorize related malware samples and draw connections between them in order to build malware families and uncover groups of attacks that might otherwise go unnoticed. We have prepared our YARA rules based on tiny similarities and oddities that stood out in the attackers’ techniques.

These rules can be used to scan networks and systems for the same patterns of code.
If some of these oddities appear during such a scan, there is a chance that the organizations has been hit by the same actor. More information about ProjectSauron is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service.

Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com
Security Update for Adobe Flash Player (3174060)Published: July 12, 2016Version: 1.0This security update resolves vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player when installed on all supported editions of Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, and Windows 10.This security update is rated Critical.

The update addresses the vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player by updating the affected Adobe Flash libraries contained within Internet Explorer 10, Internet Explorer 11, and Microsoft Edge.

For more information, see the Affected Software section.For more information about this update, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 3174060.This security update addresses the following vulnerabilities, which are described in Adobe Security Bulletin APSB16-25:CVE-2016-4173, CVE-2016-4174, CVE-2016-4175, CVE-2016-4176, CVE-2016-4177, CVE-2016-4178, CVE-2016-4179, CVE-2016-4182, CVE-2016-4188, CVE-2016-4185, CVE-2016-4222, CVE-2016-4223, CVE-2016-4224, CVE-2016-4225, CVE-2016-4226, CVE-2016-4227, CVE-2016-4228, CVE-2016-4229, CVE-2016-4230, CVE-2016-4231, CVE-2016-4232, CVE-2016-4247, CVE-2016-4248, CVE-2016-4249The following software versions or editions are affected.
Versions or editions that are not listed are either past their support life cycle or are not affected.

To determine the support life cycle for your software version or edition, see Microsoft Support Lifecycle. Operating System Component Aggregate Severity and Impact Updates Replaced*   Windows 8.1 Windows 8.1 for 32-bit Systems Adobe Flash Player(3174060) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3167685 in MS16-083 Windows 8.1 for x64-based Systems Adobe Flash Player(3174060) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3167685 in MS16-083 Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2 Windows Server 2012 Adobe Flash Player(3174060) ModerateRemote Code Execution 3167685 in MS16-083 Windows Server 2012 R2 Adobe Flash Player(3174060) ModerateRemote Code Execution 3167685 in MS16-083 Windows RT 8.1 Windows RT 8.1[1] Adobe Flash Player(3174060) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3167685 in MS16-083 Windows 10 Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems[2] Adobe Flash Player(3174060) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3167685 in MS16-083 Windows 10 for x64-based Systems[2] Adobe Flash Player(3174060) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3167685 in MS16-083 Windows 10 Version 1511 for 32-bit Systems[2] Adobe Flash Player(3174060) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3167685 in MS16-083 Windows 10 Version 1511 for x64-based Systems[2] Adobe Flash Player(3174060) CriticalRemote Code Execution 3167685 in MS16-083 [1]This update is available via Windows Update.[2]The Adobe Flash Player updates for Windows 10 updates are available via Windows Update or via the Microsoft Update Catalog.Note The vulnerabilities discussed in this bulletin affect Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview 4 and Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview 5.

The aggregate severity rating is Critical and the impact is Moderate, Remote Code Execution.

An update is available for Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview 5 via Windows Update. However, no update is available for Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview 4.

To be protected from the vulnerabilities, Microsoft recommends that customers running Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview 4 upgrade to Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview 5.*The Updates Replaced column shows only the latest update in any chain of superseded updates.

For a comprehensive list of updates replaced, go to the Microsoft Update Catalog, search for the update KB number, and then view update details (updates replaced information is provided on the Package Details tab).How could an attacker exploit these vulnerabilities? In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer for the desktop, an attacker could host a specially crafted website that is designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker could also embed an ActiveX control marked "safe for initialization" in an application or Microsoft Office document that hosts the IE rendering engine.

The attacker could also take advantage of compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements.

These websites could contain specially crafted content that could exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email.In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer in the Windows 8-style UI, an attacker would first need to compromise a website already listed in the Compatibility View (CV) list.

An attacker could then host a website that contains specially crafted Flash content designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email.

For more information about Internet Explorer and the CV List, please see the MSDN Article, Developer Guidance for websites with content for Adobe Flash Player in Windows 8.Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability.

The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:In a web-based attack scenario where the user is using Internet Explorer for the desktop, an attacker could host a website that contains a webpage that is used to exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In addition, compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit any of these vulnerabilities.
In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these websites.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the website, typically by getting them to click a link in an email message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website. Internet Explorer in the Windows 8-style UI will only play Flash content from sites listed on the Compatibility View (CV) list.

This restriction requires an attacker to first compromise a website already listed on the CV list.

An attacker could then host specially crafted Flash content designed to exploit any of these vulnerabilities through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website.

An attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content.
Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an email message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's website, or by opening an attachment sent through email. By default, all supported versions of Microsoft Outlook and Windows Live Mail open HTML email messages in the Restricted sites zone.

The Restricted sites zone, which disables scripts and ActiveX controls, helps reduce the risk of an attacker being able to use any of these vulnerabilities to execute malicious code.
If a user clicks a link in an email message, the user could still be vulnerable to exploitation of any of these vulnerabilities through the web-based attack scenario. By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration.

This mode can help reduce the likelihood of the exploitation of these Adobe Flash Player vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer. Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update.Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running You can disable attempts to instantiate Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer and other applications that honor the kill bit feature, such as Office 2007 and Office 2010, by setting the kill bit for the control in the registry. Warning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk. To set the kill bit for the control in the registry, perform the following steps: Paste the following into a text file and save it with the .reg file extension. Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 Double-click the .reg file to apply it to an individual system.You can also apply this workaround across domains by using Group Policy.

For more information about Group Policy, see the TechNet article, Group Policy collection. Note You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect. Impact of workaround.

There is no impact as long as the object is not intended to be used in Internet Explorer. How to undo the workaround. Delete the registry keys that were added in implementing this workaround.  Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Internet Explorer through Group Policy Note The Group Policy MMC snap-in can be used to set policy for a machine, for an organizational unit, or for an entire domain.

For more information about Group Policy, visit the following Microsoft Web sites: Group Policy Overview What is Group Policy Object Editor? Core Group Policy tools and settings To disable Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer through Group Policy, perform the following steps: Note This workaround does not prevent Flash from being invoked from other applications, such as Microsoft Office 2007 or Microsoft Office 2010. Open the Group Policy Management Console and configure the console to work with the appropriate Group Policy object, such as local machine, OU, or domain GPO. Navigate to the following node:Administrative Templates -> Windows Components -> Internet Explorer -> Security Features -> Add-on Management Double-click Turn off Adobe Flash in Internet Explorer and prevent applications from using Internet Explorer technology to instantiate Flash objects. Change the setting to Enabled. Click Apply and then click OK to return to the Group Policy Management Console. Refresh Group Policy on all systems or wait for the next scheduled Group Policy refresh interval for the settings to take effect.  Prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Office 2010 on affected systems Note This workaround does not prevent Adobe Flash Player from running in Internet Explorer. Warning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk. For detailed steps that you can use to prevent a control from running in Internet Explorer, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 240797.

Follow the steps in the article to create a Compatibility Flags value in the registry to prevent a COM object from being instantiated in Internet Explorer. To disable Adobe Flash Player in Office 2010 only, set the kill bit for the ActiveX control for Adobe Flash Player in the registry using the following steps: Create a text file named Disable_Flash.reg with the following contents: Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\Common\COM\Compatibility\{D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000}] "Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400 Double-click the .reg file to apply it to an individual system. Note You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect. You can also apply this workaround across domains by using Group Policy.

For more information about Group Policy, see the TechNet article, Group Policy collection. Prevent ActiveX controls from running in Office 2007 and Office 2010 To disable all ActiveX controls in Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010, including Adobe Flash Player in Internet Explorer, perform the following steps: Click File, click Options, click Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings. Click ActiveX Settings in the left-hand pane, and then select Disable all controls without notifications. Click OK to save your settings. Impact of workaround. Office documents that use embedded ActiveX controls may not display as intended. How to undo the workaround. To re-enable ActiveX controls in Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010, perform the following steps: Click File, click Options, click Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings. Click ActiveX Settings in the left-hand pane, and then deselect Disable all controls without notifications. Click OK to save your settings. Set Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones You can help protect against exploitation of these vulnerabilities by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High. To raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, perform the following steps: On the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options. In the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click Internet. Under Security level for this zone, move the slider to High.

This sets the security level for all websites you visit to High. Click Local intranet. Under Security level for this zone, move the slider to High.

This sets the security level for all websites you visit to High. Click OK to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer. Note If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High. Note Setting the level to High may cause some websites to work incorrectly.
If you have difficulty using a website after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites.

This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High. Impact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many websites on the Internet or an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality.

For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements.

Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites.
If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".   Configure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone You can help protect against exploitation of these vulnerabilities by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone.

To do this, perform the following steps: In Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu. Click the Security tab. Click Internet, and then click Custom Level. Under Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK. Click Local intranet, and then click Custom Level. Under Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK. Click OK to return to Internet Explorer, and then click OK again. Note Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some websites to work incorrectly.
If you have difficulty using a website after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites.

This will allow the site to work correctly. Impact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many websites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality.

For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround.

For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting.
If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".   Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone After you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone.

This will allow you to continue to use trusted websites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone. To do this, perform the following steps: In Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab. In the Select a web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites. If you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box. In the Add this website to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add. Repeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone. Click OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer. Note Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system.

Two sites in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com.

These are the sites that will host the update, and they require an ActiveX control to install the update. For Security Update Deployment information, see the Microsoft Knowledge Base article referenced here in the Executive Summary.Microsoft recognizes the efforts of those in the security community who help us protect customers through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.
See Acknowledgments for more information.The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.V1.0 (July 12, 2016): Bulletin published. Page generated 2016-07-07 10:53-07:00.